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ABSTRACT   
The active international profile of South Africa has attacted China’s 
increasing interests to cooperate with it at both regional and global 
levels as well as bilateral level. Globally, both countries share 
responsibilities to maintain international peace and security, deal 
with climate change, promote Africa’s development, and reform 
major international institutions. Regionally, both are major players 
which have big influence on Africa’s peace and development. The 
bilateral relationship between China and South Africa will have more 
and more strategic influence given its increasingly regional and 
global implications. 
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CCS discussion papers should contribute to the academic debate 
on China’s global rise and the consequences thereof for African 
development. We do therefore explicitly invite scholars from 
Africa, China, or elsewhere, to use this format for advanced papers 
that are ready for an initial publication, not least to obtain input 
from other colleagues in the field. Discussion papers should thus 
be seen as work in progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) 
policy-relevant discussion based on academic standards.  
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. 
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1. SOUTH AFRICA’S EMERGING POWER STATUS 
With the democratic transition of  South Africa and the rising importance of  Africa in global 
agenda, South Africa is gaining more and more visibility worldwide as an emerging power. As a 
member of  several emerging powers grouping, South Africa is projecting its power within 
Africa and outside the continent. As a new member of  BRICS, the dynamic of  South Africa‟s 
international profile deserves to be analyzed deeply. 
 
1.1 POLITICS AND ECONOMICS AS AN EMERGING POWER 
Since the end of  apartheid regime in 1994, South Africa, the most advanced economy on the 
African continent, has also become a democracy. Wider educational and economic opportunities, 
and “employment equity” policies within public and private sectors helped a new black middle 
class to emerge (Bulter 2009). According to Statistics SA‟s mid-year estimate for 2011, South 
Africa‟s population is 50.59-million, and nearly one-third (31.3%) of  the population is aged 
younger than 15 years while approximately 7.7% (or 3.9-million) is 60 years or older.1 This 
population size and age structure mean that South Africa is an emerging and dynamic economy 
with great pressure on labour training and job creation as well. South Africa itself  delivers a 
mixed picture of  what kind of  power it is. It is a dominant economy on the African continent, 
but a small economy at the global level. It is the most advanced and diversified economy in 
Africa, but with an expanded definition of  40% unemployment, predominantly among the Black 
population, and the country faces a lack of  skill and infrastructure. This mixed character makes 
South Africa a reluctant hegemon in Africa. 
A reluctant hegemon means it has the power to be a leader in Africa while it lacks political 
willingness to fulfill this role. This lack of  leadership willingness partially can be explained by the 
regional reaction. Many African elites often perceive South Africa as a self-interested „neo-
imperialist‟ actor (Mokoena 2007: 126). Secondly, South Africa is reluctant to be deeply involved 
into the regional affairs with the intention of  avoiding to be linked to its past relationship with 
the region during its apartheid regime. Thirdly, a jobless growth raises domestic concerns of  
spending revenues abroad (fuelling even xenophobic violence in 2008). At the same time, South 
Africa links its own sustainable development to the stability and development of  Africa, which 
requires South Africa to assume its leading role in maintaining regional peace and development. 
The weak regional institutions cannot solve serious regional issues, which require South Africa 
deliver a clearer voice of  its own in regional affairs. The leadership style might change against 
the changing regional situation. 
The challenging domestic development agenda pushed the Mbeki government to make it clear 
that the priority of  South African foreign policy was to advance business interests. The paradox 
of  this economic diplomacy is that it puts emphasis on Africa and countries from South while 
most of  its major trading partners and know-how providers are from the Western world, 
especially Western Europe and the United States. The current debates among politicians on 
whether to nationalize the important sectors critical to government revenue will impair the 
                                                             
1 SouthAfrica.info, “South Africa reaches 50-million,” July 27, 2011, 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/population-mid2011.htm#ixzz1TOVZGgSR 
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confidence of  foreign investors to South Africa. Since the end of  apartheid, the dynamic and 
pro-active private sector of  South Africa has penetrated into the region while its government 
policy lagged this pace and is felt to not being able to serve its entrepreneurs quite well. The rise 
of  other major economies in Africa also put strong competition pressure on South Africa in 
attracting foreign investment and enhancing trading relations. How to train more skilled labour 
and build more public transportation system while maintaining domestic stability has been an 
urgent challenge for maintaining South African regional leadership. 
 
1.2 INCREASINGLY VISIBLE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INFLUENCE 
South Africa is often cited as one the most important regional powers. To gain trust and 
confidence from the rest of  the region has been a big challenge of  the post-Apartheid regime. 
Although it began with a severe scenario of  wars, interventions and conflicts, after the political 
transition in South Africa in 1994, a reasonable resolution of  disputes with Angola, Namibia 
and Mozambique was achieved, significantly reducing political tensions in the entire region 
(Sennes 2006). South Africa has learnt a lesson when Mandela‟s intervention in a human rights 
crisis in Nigeria (around the death sentence for activist Ken Saro Wiwa) was condemned by 
other African leaders for high handiness and interference, and by domestic liberation movement 
critics for acting on behalf  of  the West against a fellow African regime. South Africa began to 
engage with the region by constructing political institutions and setting up cooperation and 
dialogue arrangements with an intention to build a co-prosperity zone. The transformation of  
the old „club‟ of  frontline states into the South African Development and Cooperation 
Community (SADC) and the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) reflected the 
leadership and commitment of  South Africa in promoting regional cooperation. Partnership 
rather than regional superpower is the choice of  the post-Apartheid South Africa. 
One key component of  Thabo Mbeki‟s foreign policy thinking was the „African Renaissance‟. 
According to Mbeki‟s regional vision, a democratic and liberal political-economic restructuring 
of  the African continent was offered as the key to economic upliftment and long-term 
prosperity (Shelton 2006). The African Union and its supporting agency NEPAD were the key 
hope of  the Mbeki administration for realizing the African Renaissance. The African Union was 
launched with a leading role played by South Africa in Durban in 2002 and South Africa became 
the home of  the Pan-African Parliament. NEPAD was established to build collective efforts to 
promote African economic growth in general, so that Africa can achieve sustainable growth and 
benefit from the participation of  globalized world economy. One way to achieve this goal was 
thought to be improving governance capacity through a NEPAD Peer Review System (the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, APRM). Promoting the integration of  the SADC, the unity 
and the renewal of  the African continent are still a declared priority of  the current 
administration of  President Zuma. The academic community in South Africa can be seen as a 
supportive asset for this purpose: Most of  the leading continental think tanks on studying 
African issues are located in South Africa.  
South Africa‟s vision on the importance of  regional security and stability for both Africa‟s and 
its own sustainable development also reflected in SADC‟s security related protocols and AU‟s 
Peace and Security Council. Both institutions‟ security efforts aim at promoting peace and 
security in the region by adopting collective action. By offering initiatives or working through 
regional institutions, South Africa has made significant contributions to the peace of  Central 
African Republic, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan and Burundi etc. South Africa‟s pursuit of  UN 
Security Council permanent seat also reflects its ambition in maintaining regional peace and 
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stability. South Africa is the most influential and leading candidate for the permanent seat of  
UN Security Council considering its increasingly active support to regional peace-keeping, 
peace-making operations and post-conflict reconstruction. However, South Africa‟s voting for 
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 delivered a mixed and controversial message to the rest of  
the region. The paradox is South Africa has to show its desire to prevent humanitarian crisis 
while the AU and its capacity can‟t support African solutions for African problems. The 
complexity of  many disputes in Africa also increased the difficulty to provide an effective 
diplomatic and regional solution. 
Despite its relative smaller economic strength, military might and population size comparing 
with other emerging powers, South Africa has a more prominent voice in world politics. It‟s the 
only African nation with a seat at the G-20 summit. One aspect of  this story is the difficulties 
and complexity of  solving the African issues which needs a global cooperation rather than that 
South Africa can solve them individually. The world needs one prominent African country to 
discuss these challenges at global forums to increase the legitimacy of  such discussion. Besides 
African agenda, South Africa is an important global player in promoting the reform of  the post-
Second World War governance system such as the reform of  UN Security Council, IMF and 
World Bank etc. South Africa also plays an active role in international negotiations on climate 
change and world trade. South Africa‟s successful hosting the World Cup in 2010 showed that it 
has the capacity to organize such major global sporting events safely and effectively.  
South Africa has been an important dialogue partner in global forums with established powers 
on global and regional challenges. One function of  such dialogue is to ensure that the 
international community to support African agenda constructively. Rather than only focus on 
trade and development cooperation, both South Africa and EU are working together to further 
deepen cooperation in order to help address the many global and regional challenges by 
adopting the SA-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan in 2007. South Africa has been 
invited annually by G8 to attend its summit expanded dialogue forum since the development 
issue of  Africa becoming an important topic of  the summit. Such engagements with established 
powers show that South Africa doesn‟t have the power to pursue its interests unilaterally, and 
invest heavily in multilateral processes was expected to serve its broad interests regionally and 
globally. The decline of  western powers, the rise of  emerging powers and the challenge of  
global issues offer an access for South Africa to global governance system. Membership of  G20 
summit as a global forum put South Africa onto the vital forum coordinating world economy 
macro-policies. 
 
1.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMERGING POWER’S GROUPING MEMBERSHIP  
South Africa‟s global south and emerging power diplomacy has been witnessed by its 
membership of  the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, BASIC/G4 (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, Indian, China and South Africa). All 
of  these emerging powers grouping aimed at achieving common interests through the 
cooperation among group members. Though it is controversial about Russia‟s identity as a 
developing country, international community treat these grouping as South-South cooperation. 
With the ongoing power shift in international system and the lasting financial crises in 
developed countries, the membership of  emerging powers‟ groupings has some important 
implications for South Africa‟s external strategy. 
IBSA, the first grouping composed of  major emerging powers, was inaugurated in June 2003. 
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The initial agenda of  IBSA was to democratize global institutions such as the United Nations 
and Bretton Woods institutions, and give concrete shape to the ideal of  promoting the 
economic and social interests of  the South. It‟s difficult for these three big emerging powers to 
transform the global institutions, therefore IBSA currently focuses on the trilateral cooperation 
on trade, security, bio-fuels, social development, and research and development as well 
(Mokoena 2007: 125). Obviously, the shared values, similar political system and common views 
on reforming the global institutions are frequently quoted as supporting strengths of  the 
grouping. However, these factors are not supporting enough to either change the world order or 
make benefit for its members. South Africa needs the grouping to help its African agenda and 
explore the trilateral cooperation potential for its domestic development. 
The BASIC countries, formed in 2009, are a sector-based cooperation among emerging powers 
to influence the international negotiations on climate changes. The main idea is to fight for a fair 
and just solution and burden-sharing on climate change issues by taking advantages of  a group 
voice. The four countries also showed leading example by announcing their plans to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions and making their efforts to provide financial and technical aid to the 
poorer nations. The group insists that there should be a legally binding global agreement on 
long-term cooperative action under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), and developing countries should have equitable space for development and get 
finance, technology and capacity-building support from developed countries which have 
historical responsibility for climate change. As a high per-capital greenhouse gas emitter, it is in 
South Africa‟s interest to get financial and technological support to reduce its emission. 
The creation of  BRIC summit in 2009 transformed the economic conception into a geopolitical 
one. The join of  South Africa into the group makes it looks like a global forum. Though BRICS 
has the similar agenda to IBSA, BRICS offers more international prestige for South Africa than 
IBSA and provides an opportunity for South Africa to put its African agenda into a more 
relevant grouping since China, India and Brazil are major emerging players in African continent. 
 
2. SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
As an emerging power, what important is the regional and global influence of  its diplomacy. 
South Africa is rebuilding its regional legitimacy as a leading player in Africa and engaging pro-
actively with the rest of  the world to pursue a proper position in transitional international 
system. South Africa is playing an increasing visible role in current global governance system as 
a member of  important grouping forums especially the grouping composed of  emerging 
powers. 
 
2.1 REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
As a regional power, South Africa identifies the regional stability and development as its first 
diplomatic priority. This includes building and strengthening the institutions of  both the African 
Union (AU) as well as those of  sub-regional initiatives such as the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) and NEPAD. South Africa also committed itself  to support 
peace, security, stability and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives including participation in the 
implementation of  Africa‟s peace and security agenda and management of  peace missions. The 
basic idea is that both socio-economic development and peace are necessary to achieve regional 
sustainable development. Instability is caused by a number of  factors including 
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underdevelopment and weakened institutions of  governance. In doing so, the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) was developed as a programme of  NEPAD to promote people-
centered development and democratic systems of  political, economic and social governance in 
the region.  
Africa has been one of  the most potential continents for future growth. After finished the 
democratic transition, South Africa tried to reintegrate into the region. Its export to the region 
comprises higher value added products, which in turn supports South African industrial 
development and employment objectives. It‟s a leading economic player in the region. The 
NEPAD was created to promote the continent‟s socio-economic development. To forge closer 
economic cooperation and take advantage of  size-effects to deal with a globalized world 
economy, Africa‟s leaders decided to build the African Economic Community (AEC). Through 
NEPAD, South Africa introduced the notion of  “mutual accountability and mutual 
responsibility” between Africa and its overseas development interlocutors, which helps to 
establish a healthy and sustainable partnership for African development.  
South Africa has contributed huge political, financial and military resources in regional peace 
and security. And South Africa‟s approach to the regional security is act through United Nations 
and the AU with a preference of  peaceful means such as political dialogue. The approach is 
much related South Africa‟s own history of  successful political dialogue in achieving peaceful 
transition. South Africa has played important mediation and facilitation role in Burundi, DRC, 
Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Zimbabwe and others. With South Africa‟s leadership, the AU moved 
to emphasize the need to strengthen capacities and actions in conflict prevention. The African 
Union has established its peace and security architecture, it‟s an important step even though it‟s 
still very weak. The emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction and development also reflects the 
thought that peace and development are intensely interlinked. South Africa also puts emphasis 
on human security and social justice rather than traditional military security of  states. 
 
2.2 GLOBAL AGENDA WITHIN THE EMERGING POWER GROUPS 
South Africa is a regional power with global presence. South Africa has been seen as 
punching above its weight, expanding the common ground between North and South and 
earning the country the status of  a „middle power facilitator‟ (Lee 2006: 56). South Africa also 
wants to be an African voice internationally. In doing so, South Africa is actively participating 
into the international cooperation on African related issues such as adapting to climate change, 
international development policy, world trade system negotiation, and reforms of  major 
international institutions. South Africa supports the democratization of  international institutions 
including IMF, World Bank, the UN and WTO so that developing countries especially African 
countries could have a bigger voice in the to be reformed institutions.  
 
2.2.1 EMERGING ROLE IN THE UN 
South Africa treats its second term of  non-permanent membership of  the UN Security Council 
in 2011-2012 as an opportunity to promote the African agenda, promote the country‟s national 
priorities and advance the maintenance of  international peace and security for socio-economic 
development to prosper. To pursuit the reform of  the UNSC, South Africa needs to advance 
the African agenda in a way combining both African and outsider‟s approaches. When South 
African Ambassador to the UN Dumisani Kumalo reviewed the first UNSC 2007-2008 term of  
South Africa, he mentioned the following points: the dilemma in balancing differing 
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expectations whilst trying to uphold the dictates of  the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive 
Act; South Africa is always reacting to the powerful members‟ viewpoints while it can play an 
active role when it comes to the AU and the Security Council (Masters 2010: 10-11). South 
Africa was further being argued as a spokesperson and champion of  the Non-Aligned 
Movement group and developing world during its first UNSC term (Masters 2010: 11).  
To get the credibility both from African continent and worldwide, South Africa is enhancing its 
public diplomacy to introduce its intention and voting behavior in UNSC. South Africa briefs to 
the AU and SADC on the issues on the UNSC agenda to get support from its neighborhoods. 
To some extent, South Africa has to take account of  African agenda in UNSC since it has a 
relative limited power leverages independently comparing with other major emerging powers. As 
to its second term membership in UNSC, South Africa whether South Africa will keep a low 
profile in promoting its value and principles, pushing reform of  UNSC or driven by national 
interests and hesitating in UNSC reform are being debated. Considering the differences either 
among the P5 or within the BRICS on how UN works and its reform agenda, a more pragmatic 
and moderate approach might be the choice of  South Africa during its second UNSC term. 
South Africa‟s second term on the Council will also be judged within the context of  a 
coordinated IBSA or BRICS strategy. It seems that South Africa will try to deliver its own voice 
based on its understanding of  being a capable responsible global citizen. However, there is not a 
domestic consensus on what‟s the expectation and cost South Africa wants to take. 
 
2.2.2 ECONOMIC GLOBAL GOVERNANCE REFORMER 
South Africa is the only African country as a member of  G20 summit which is the primary 
forum on world economic issues. As a member of  BRICS, South African minister is discussing 
with his counterparts within the group on whether to provide financial support to the European 
countries suffering debt crisis. As an emerging economy, South Africa is preparing to project its 
influence to the reform of  international financial, trade and investment system. However, the 
paradox of  current Group politics is that the challenges G20 dealing with are mainly located in 
the developed countries, the African agenda related issues such as aid effectiveness and 
development are difficult to be listed on the G20 agenda. Against this backdrop, it‟s hard for 
South Africa to deliver some good news through G20 to the African continent. It will be 
ironical for South Africa to spend money on supporting the EU members getting out of  
difficult times while its neighbors are struggling for survival, while it might be the reasonable 
burden for emerging powers. Once again, it is the industrialized powers that control the agenda-
setting rather than emerging powers. When the industrialized countries fell into trouble 
themselves, it is especially difficult for them to take Africa‟s interests and concerns as priority 
with financial resources supporting. 
Some South African scholars are arguing that South Africa should take its leadership role in G20 
to take up the cause of  development. The leadership of  South Africa should let G20 focus on 
development, create accountability by monitoring mechanism to ensure both developed 
countries and poor countries in Africa fulfill their commitments, and provide funding to the 
G8/Africa partnership (Landsberg 2011). Requiring the G20 to make similar commitments to 
African development implies that emerging economies be treated as donors which hasn‟t been 
fully accepted by the emerging economies. Most of  the emerging powers prefer bilateral means 
to facilitate the development issues in Africa which is different from the way preferred by the 
OECD countries. Transparency and accountability on the development aids of  emerging powers 
are also needed to be raised in the eyes of  traditional development donors. To forge a common 
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understanding and commitment from G20 to African agenda will be an incremental process. 
G20 has formed a development working group and South Africa is the co-chair of  the working 
group which looked for best practices of  growth. How to promote G20 work hard on 
development issue still needs to be observed. 
Within the G20 framework, the voting share of  emerging powers in IMF and WB was being 
raised, which is a broad achievements for South Africa since there is little chance for it to raise 
its share in the Bretton Woods institutions. Since South Africa received no funding from the 
IMF, and the government‟s macroeconomic policies match with the conservative economic 
policy norms that the organization promotes, what South Africa sought is to influence the 
organization‟s agenda and governance structure. The real chance for South Africa came when 
Mr. Strauss-Kahn left the IMF, because observers expected BRICS would propose a candidate 
for IMF presidency and the most possible candidate BRICS launch should be a South African 
(Grimm 2011). The failure to propose a BRICS candidate shows clearly the weakness of  the 
group in world financial governance system. Even the group reaches a consensus on its 
candidate to Bretton Woods institutions, the further question will be raised on what kind of  
alternative agenda or approach the group can deliver. How to pursue a sustainable growth road 
also a challenge for emerging powers including South Africa since their economies relied too 
heavily on export. The real challenge is that the group has to offer its own solutions or public 
goods besides asking their counterparts in developed countries to fulfill their commitments. A 
cooperative and effective approach should be built between emerging powers and established 
powers in dealing with world economic issues. 
 
2.2.3 BASIC AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATION  
South Africa is a major greenhouse gas emitter and the world‟s sixth largest producer of  carbon 
dioxide even though it isn‟t the sixth largest economy. This poor environmental record was 
mainly caused by heavy industries and polluting energy sector. With financial and technological 
support from developed countries, South Africa plans to reduce emissions by 34% below 
„business as usual‟ levels by 2020 and by 42% by 2025. Against this domestic backdrop, South 
Africa is active at international level in dealing with environmental challenges. The Conference 
of  the Parties (COP) 17th United Nations conference on climate change in Durban from 28 
November to 9 December 2011 is such a case on South Africa‟s efforts on climate issues. The 
working conference will attract 194 countries, 1200 nongovernmental organizations and 20 000-
25 000 delegates. This big event will test the country‟s capacity again after a successful world cup, 
but more challenging thing is what Durban conference can offer after the previous conferences 
failed to produce a legally binding climate treaty.  
Considering its domestic environmental challenge, South Africa prefers to stand with the 
developing countries as the most appropriate platform for negotiations. After the cooperation as 
a member of  Outreach 5 (Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India and China) in the G8+5 dialogues, 
South Africa now act as a more influential group of  BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China). The core argument of  BASIC is that industrialized nations should assume their 
historical responsibility legally and offer technology and financial support to developing 
countries, and developing countries should assume their common but differentiated 
responsibilities with enough space for development. BASIC‟s Copenhagen Accord failed to 
address the concerns of  small Island states which questioned the unity of  developing countries‟ 
positions on international climate change negotiation. South Africa‟s own prominent position at 
the negotiating table sparked frustration by those who found themselves in the corridors. How 
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to represent Africa as a whole properly with the rising influence of  BASIC is a future challenge 
for South Africa‟s climate change diplomacy. 
 
2.3 THE IBSA AND BRICS DILEMMA 
The new membership of  BRICS brought a bi-membership dilemma for South Africa as a 
member of  both IBSA and BRICS. The lobby of  South Africa to join the BRIC group clearly 
shows that BRICS has something different from IBSA, while we can‟t say that South Africa will 
abandon IBSA immediately since it is a member of  BRICS. Most scholars argued that BRICS 
can offer more important international prestige for South Africa than IBSA could. However, the 
key difference is that BRICS has a systematic influence that IBSA tries to obtain. IBSA has 
ambitious goal to reform the current international order while its cooperation was mainly 
limited in the field of  trilateral cooperation among themselves and their regions. What South 
Africa expected from a membership of  BRIC directly is to achieve its economic diplomacy, and 
its deeper intention should be to obtain more influence on regional and global affairs by joining 
a more global and influential group. 
Strong skepticism exists in South Africa about BRICS‟s future role in international system, since 
the grouping members are so different with each other, a lot of  geopolitical competitions 
between some members, and their competition with each other on trade issues. Based on this 
skeptic thinking, they argued that IBSA is a better choice because of  the similarity of  political 
system and values, identity of  developing counties and common agenda towards global 
governance structure reform. Less members also means less difficulties in forging collective 
actions. IBSA is still attractive for South Africa in its regional development agenda with the 
projects like IBSA development fund. However, whether BRICS could develop such projects is 
an open question. IBSA‟s common agenda on UNSC reform also needs the support from other 
members of  BRICS namely China and Russia. Overlapping membership and similar agenda will 
make one of  them lose its momentum in the long run though it‟s too early to say which one 
should be replaced. 
 
3. SINO-SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
The establishment of  diplomatic relationship in 1997 was a big event for both China and South 
Africa. China was a consistent supporter of  South Africa‟s cause of  anti-Apartheid, and South 
Africa realized that it couldn‟t afford to lose China‟s international influence and economic 
potential. South Arica‟s diplomatic acknowledgement shifting to Beijing is important for China-
African relationship and breaking China‟s diplomacy difficulties in the beginning of  1990s. After 
more than one decade development, China nowadays is South Africa‟s largest trading partner 
and export destination, and one of  the most important external players in African continent. 
The China-South Africa relationship has been raised to the comprehensive strategic level, which 
has increasing visible regional and global implications. 
South Africa is not a typical African country in terms of  its economic performance. As the most 
advanced economy, South Africa has the capacity to invest China with its competitive 
transnational enterprises. The investment from South Africa in China includes not only capital 
investment but also technology transfer like SASOL‟s technology. China also found numerous 
cooperation opportunities in South Africa in the fields of  trade, investment, technology, defense 
and cultural exchange. Since ICBC‟s acquisition of  a 20 per cent shareholding in Standard Bank 
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Group in 2007, the two banks have cooperated formally on numerous transactions across 
multiple geographies and sectors, and find more opportunities in the internationalization 
process of  RMB. As competitive economies in the developing world, both countries also have 
interests to share each other‟s development experiences to achieve further domestic 
development.  
Both sides highly emphasize each other‟s positive role in promoting the development, security 
and stability of  African continent, which is an important part of  the bilateral strategic 
cooperation. South Africa is the continent‟s most advanced economy, strongest peace-keeping 
player and qualified leader of  regional integration. China supports the constructive role South 
Arica plays in the region where China has increasing overseas interests. The Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation has made many achievements for mutual beneficial developments. The 
forum also pays close attention to coordinate with region‟s institutions such as AU and NEPAD 
in which South Africa plays a leading role. China‟s interest in Africa was also prompting other 
countries to increasingly look at the continent, positioning it as the world‟s playing field over the 
next decade. As stakeholders of  the region, they should enhance exchanges on their approaches 
to regional affairs. China‟s interaction with Africa in terms of  its assistance, economic activities, 
and trade model has been increasingly concerned by South Africa. 
Beijing‟s invitation of  South Africa as a new member of  BRICS confirmed China‟s 
reorganization of  South Africa‟s leadership role in Africa and global influence on key agendas 
of  international system. South Africa is one of  the most important players in the process of  
African integration, and it‟s necessary for China to enhance its coordination with South Africa in 
dealing with regional issues. South Africa‟s membership increased the relevance of  BRICS as a 
global group of  major developing countries. With the new membership of  South Africa, BRICS 
can address the African issues more effectively and attract more concerns to Africa‟s demands 
from international community. At the global forefronts, both countries played important roles in 
climate change, peace-keeping, international development especially in Africa, world trade, and 
reform of  IMF, etc. Both countries support the cooperation of  emerging powers in terms of  
not only exploring each other‟s market, but also building a more just and fair international order. 
To conclude, it is clear that despite its smaller economy size and huge domestic challenges, 
South Africa is a qualified regional leader and capable global player. South Africa‟s commitment 
to regional development, stability and peace and its cooperation with major developing countries 
on selective global agendas gained a unique leadership which China values. The strategic and 
comprehensive Sino-South African partnership is a mutual beneficial relationship with emerging 
regional and global influence. The consolidation of  BRICS in dealing with regional and global 
affairs needs both countries contribute more commitment of  political, economic and mental 
resources. 
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